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INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF SHIFTS IN
PARTNERSHIP PROFIT AND LOSS
INTERESTS
Limited partnerships have become increasingly common
investment vehicles for high-income taxpayers because of the tax
advantages of the pass-through concept of partnerships.' Limited
partnerships are entities that report profits and losses on a partnership
tax return, but the individual partners bear the tax consequences.2
Usually, several limited partners provide the bulk of the start-up funds
for a limited partnership, while one or more general partners, who
make less significant contributions of property, assume responsibility
for the day-to-day operations and management of the partnership. The
Internal Revenue Code (Code) allows a variety of methods for
structuring such partnerships,3 depending on the needs of the
individual partners. With one frequently used method known as the
"flip-flop,"'4 partners allocate in advance their profits and losses for a
predetermined period of time; only after that time do the percentage
allocations among partners change.5
The following hypothetical transaction illustrates a ffip-flop in a
limited partnership, composed of two limited partners, A and B, and a
general partner, C. Assume the partnership's purpose is to invest in
real estate and that A and B contribute ninety percent of the
partnership's start-up capital of $100,000; general partner C contributes
the remaining ten percent. In order that the limited partners may take
1. As Arthur Willis has stated, "[tihe limited partnership became considerably more
popular when taxpayers and their advisers recognized the tax advantages of the pass-through
concept of partnerships." 3 A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAITE, PARTNERSHIP TAXATION
app. B-i (3d ed. 1981).
2. For a brief background discussion of the development of the partnership concept, see id
at § 1.04. Under Subchapter K of the Internal Revenue Code, partners can allocate gain, loss,
deductions, income,-or credits among themselves as they see fit, without regard for their capital
contributions. 26 U.S.C. § 704(a) (1982).
3. See, e.g., Weidner, Passing Depreciation to Investor-Partners, 25 S.C.L. REv. 215, 220
(1973) (explanation of different methods of defining partners' rights); Westin, The Hazy Boundary
Between Partnership Allocations and Distributions, 9 J. REAL EST. TAX'N 22, 22-23 (1981) (profits,
losses, and cash distributions may be shared in accordance with partners' capital contributions, or
capital partners may recoup their capital contributions before general partners begin drawing
profits; alternatively, partners may provide for distributions that vary according to the amount and
duration of the capital partners' investments).
4. See Seago & Horvitz, Some Subtle Effects of the Partnership Constructive Distribution
Rules, 58 TAXES 97, 99 (1980).
5. See I A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAITE, supra note 1, at § 46.01.
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advantage of the substantial losses that they expect during the initial
years of the venture,6 the partners agree to allocate profits and losses
for the first five years7 in the same ratio as the partners' contributions to
start-up capital: ninety percent to ten percent. At the end of five years
the partners agree to change the allocation of profits and losses to
reflect the anticipated profits from the venture, so that A and B will
receive fifty percent of the profits and losses, and C will receive the
other fifty percent.
When potential investors consider the tax consequences of such a
flip-flop arrangement, the question arises whether such a shift in
allocation of profits and losses constitutes a sale or exchange of a
partnership interest under section 741 of the Internal Revenue Code,8
or, alternatively, whether it amounts to a constructive distribution of
cash under section 752. 9 The courts have not yet decided this
question; I° indeed, there is a dearth of case law discussing flip-flops in
any context.I Commentators, however, have uniformly concluded that
flip-flops do constitute taxable events. For example, the authors of one
treatise suggest that:
[One] situation in which a partner may receive a money distri-
bution in excess of the basis of his interest occurs when the partner's
share of partnership liabilities is reduced, giving rise to a § 752(b)
constructive cash distribution. For example, if the partnership's basis
in its assets is less than the outstanding balance of the partnership's
nonrecourse indebtedness, as is often the case in tax-shelter partner-
ships, a shift in the ratio in which the partners share profits. . . may
trigger cash distributions to the partners whose profits interests are
reduced in excess of their basis in their partnership interests. 12
6. Accelerated depreciation is allowed for real property, 26 U.S.C. § 168(b)(2) (1982).
Subsequent citations to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, codified at title 26 of U.S. Code, will
be in the form "I.R.C."
7. Alternatively, limited partnerships sometimes provide that the flip-flop will take place
after the limited partners' capital contributions have been recouped from partnership profits. See,
e.g., Westin, supra note 3, at 26.
8. I.R.C. § 741 (1982) provides for recognition of gain to a partner upon sale or exchange of
a partnership interest. See infra text accompanying note 16.
9. I.R.C. § 752(b) (1982) provides that a reduction in a partner's share of partnership
liabilities will be treated as a constructive distribution of cash to the partner. See infra text
accompanying note 24.
10. 1 A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAITE, supra note 1, at § 46.03.
11. One exception is Hamilton v. United States, 82-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) [ 9546 (Ct. Cl.
1982) (partner's "net profits interest," guaranteed by provision in partnership agreement that
acceleration of shift to more favorable profit/loss share for general partners could be brought
about by payment to limited partners of specified portion of limited partners' unrecovered capital
contributions, held to reflect economic reality and not to constitute a loan or transfer of interest).
12. W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, FEDERAL TAXATION OF PARTNERSHIPS AND




This note analyzes the tax consequences of flip-flops in a limited
partnership from three distinct viewpoints, examining whether any
analysis can justify nonrecognition. The note first considers the possi-
bility of either sale or exchange treatment or constructive distribution
treatment of ffip-flops. t3 Then, it discusses whether partners' capital
interests are relevant to deciding whether a taxable event has oc-
curred. 14 Finally, it looks at the question of whether partners obtain
economic gain at the time of a shift in profit and loss interests. 15 The
note concludes that because none of these methods of analyzing flip-
flops justify nonrecognition, flip-flops are taxable events under section
752.
I. THE LANGUAGE OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE AND
REGULATIONS
A. Section 741: Sale or Exchange.
Section 741 of the Internal Revenue Code deals with sales and
exchanges of partnership interests:
In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership,
gain or loss shall be recognized to the transferor partner. Such gain
or loss shall be considered as gain or loss from the sale or exchange
of a capital asset, except as otherwise provided in section 751 .... 16
The Supreme Court has held that when the Internal Revenue Code
uses the words "sale" and "exchange" these words should be under-
stood in the ordinary sense.' 7 Thus, the Court has held that when a
partnership receives insurance proceeds no sale or exchange occurs
under the Code because consideration is lacking.' 8 Similarly, the Tax
Court has held that when a partner withdraws from a law firm without
receiving any compensation for the partnership interest that has re-
verted to the firm, a forfeiture has occurred rather than a sale or ex-
change.' 9 These holdings indicate that for a sale or exchange to occur
under the Code, a taxpayer's interest in some asset must terminate and
the taxpayer must receive some economic benefit in exchange for the
asset.
13. See infra notes 16-39 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 40-53 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 54-71 and accompanying text.
16. I.R.C. § 741 (1982).
17. Helvering v. William Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 249 (1941) (insurance pro-
ceeds for fire damage held not a sale or exchange); see also Hale v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 356
(1935), aJJ'd, 85 F.2d 819, 822 (D.C. Cir. 1936).
18. Helvering v. Flaccus Oak Leather Co., 313 U.S. 247, 249 (1941).
19. Palmer Hutcheson v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 14 (1951); Gannon v. Commissioner, 16
T.C. 1134, 1139 (1951).
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Section 741's sale or exchange provision may apply to flip-flops if
a partner's surrender of a certain percentage of his partnership interest
constitutes a termination of some interest. The change in the partner's
profit and loss interest that occurs at the time of the flip-flop arguably
relieves him of a corresponding portion of the partnership's liabilities,
thereby providing the requisite economic benefit to characterize the
event as a sale or exchange.
This argument, however, fails to take account of several character-
istics of the flip-flop. The limited partner whose profit and loss interest
decreases neither receives20 nor disposes21 of anything of value. The
limited partners continue to have an interest in the partnership after the
flip-flop. The only difference in the partners' interests before and after
the flip-flop is the change in his profit and loss sharing ratios. The pre-
arranged shift in profit and loss sharing merely results in a revised
schedule governing allocation of future income; no distribution or
transfer of currently held assets takes place. In this sense, flip-flops are
similar to forfeitures: There is no surrender of a partnership interest
for valuable consideration.22 Thus, the sale-or-exchange language of
section 741 probably does not generate tax liability for limited partners
who engage in a ffip-flop. 23
B. Section 752: Constructive Distributions.
Although flip-flops do not seem to fall within section 741, they
may come within the ambit of section 752. That section provides:
(b) Decrease in partner's liabilities-Any decrease in a partner's
share of the liabilities of a partnership, or any decrease in a partner's
individual liabilities by reason of the assumption by the partnership
20. To the extent that a shift in profit and loss sharing can trigger a concomitant shift in a
partner's share of partnership liabilities, the tax consequences are properly considered under a
constructive distribution analysis. See infra notes 24-39 and accompanying text.
21. A limited partner might lose the right to future income or deductions, but such a right is
intangible and cannot be valued.
22. Cf. supra text accompanying note 19 (termination of an interest according to prearranged
partnership agreement is not a sale or exchange).
23. Admittedly, not every instance of a sale or exchange consists of a simple transfer between
two individuals of a partnership interest for cash. Courts have found, for example, that a sale or
exchange occurred in transactions that did not involve any cash payments when the transactions
included the receipt of some noncash interest. See, e.g., Robinson v. Elliot, 262 F.2d 383 (9th Cir.
1958) (agreement that included 10-year lease with option to purchase, where nominal lessee was
responsible for all burdens of ownership, held to be a sale); Downer v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 86
(1967) (transfer of 100,000 shares of stock by employer to employee, where latter thereupon
agreed to continue employment, held to be a sale or exchange). Similarly, a court has found that
circuitous transfers aimed at disguising the form of a transaction involve a sale or exchange when
a transfer of interests occurs. See Crenshaw v. United States, 450 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1971). Flip-
flops do not fit within either of these categories, however.
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of such liabilities, shall be considered as a distribution of money to
the partner by the partnership. 24
Section 752(b) recognizes a constructive distribution if the decrease in
profit and loss sharing is accompanied by a decrease in the affected
partner's share of partnership liabilities. Such a corresponding de-
crease seems mandated by Treasury Regulation 1.752-1(e), which
states: "A partner's share of partnership liabilities shall be determined
in accordance with his ratio for sharing losses under the partnership
agreement. '25 In other words, the reduction in partnership losses that
occurs as part of the ffip-flop may bring about a reduction in a partner's
share of partnership liabilities by operation of Treasury Regulation
1.752-1(b). The Code would treat this reduction as a constructive dis-
tribution of cash, which is taxed under section 752(b)'s treatment of a
"[d]ecrease in partner's liabilities. ' 26 This brief discussion would seem
to leave little doubt that flip-flops are taxable events under section 752;
no court, however, has decided whether a decrease in profit and loss
sharing triggers a section 752(b) distribution,27 although some com-
mentators have suggested that it does.28
Despite the preceding analysis, it is possible to argue that section
752 does not apply to flip-flops. Recall the hypothetical partnership
described above.29 Assume that after the partners contributed $100,000
in start-up capital, they borrowed $400,000 on a nonrecourse note.
Limited partners A and B, with equal profit and loss sharing interests of
forty-five percent, can each include $180,000 in the basis of their part-
nership interests, in addition to the $45,000 start-up capital that each
contributed. Assume the venture generated substantial depreciation
deductions in its first few operating years,30 so that after five years, at
which point the agreement states that the shift in profit and loss sharing
is to take place, the partnership has generated $350,000 in losses. The
financial accounting for both A and B would be as follows:
24. I.R.C. § 752(b) (1982).
25. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1983); see infra note 40 and accompanying text.
26. I.R.C. § 752(b) (1982) (introductory language).
27. See 1 A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAITE, supra note 1, at § 46.03.
28. See, e.g., id; Seago & Horvitz, supra note 4, at 99 ("A constructive distribution to the
limited partners occurs when the profit and loss ratios change.").





Capital contribution $ 45,000
Share of partnership liabilities
(nonrecourse mortgage) 180,000
Share of partnership losses
(45% of $350,000) (157,500)
Adjusted basis in partnership
interest at end of five years 67,500
The argument for construing the shift in profit and loss sharing as
a constructive distribution of cash under section 752(b) is that after the
shift, a partner's share of the partnership's liabilities must also be de-
creased, requiring an adjustment to basis.3' That is, the reduction in
liability is viewed not as a sale or exchange, but rather as a distribution
of cash that must be offset against the limited partner's basis in his
partnership interest. Under a constructive distribution theory, there-
fore, gain is realized to the limited partner. The financial analysis
would continue for the limited partners as follows:
Table II
Basis in partnership interest
after five years $ 67,500
Reduction in liability
(45% of $350,000 less
25% of $350,000) (70,000)
Taxable gain 2,500
This analysis may, however, be challenged by examining the
Treasury Regulations under section 752. Treasury Regulation 1.752-
l(b)(1) states in part that "[w]here the liabilities of a partnership are
decreased, and each partner's share of such liabilities is thereby de-
creased, the amount of the decrease shall be treated as a distribution of
money to the partner by the partnership. '3 2 This language could be
interpreted to suggest that application of section 752 is contingent on
both a reduction in a partner's liability and a decrease in the partner-
ship's liabilities, at least in cases covered by the above-quoted part of
the regulation.
The hypothetical ffip-flop described above does not seem to come
within the coverage of that part of the regulation because no reduction
in partnership liabilities took place. The regulation contemplates the
reduction by the partnership of the partnership's indebtedness that was
31. See I A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAITE, supra note 1, at § 46.03.
32. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(b)(1) (1960) (emphasis added).
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a portion of the partner's tax basis. For example, the limited partners
in the hypothetical each included $180,000 of the partnership's
$400,000 nonrecourse mortgage note in the basis of their partnership
interests. If the mortgage indebtedness was subsequently reduced by
$100,000, limited partners A and B would each have to reduce their
basis by $45,000; if that reduction exceeded the partner's adjusted basis,
the partners would be taxed on the excess or the resulting gain.33 No
such reduction in the partnership's debt has occurred, however, be-
cause the shift in profit and loss sharing has no effect on the mortgage
debt. Instead, there has been merely an "internal" shift-among the
partners-in the proportion of profits and losses to which each partner
will be entitled in the future. The condition that is set forth in the first
sentence of Treasury Regulation 1.752-1(b)(1), reduction in the debt,
has not been met. Because no such reduction has taken place, the part-
nership owes the same amount of money that it did before the profit
and loss shift; thus, the regulation arguably is inapplicable.
Subsection (b)(2) of the same regulation sets forth an alternative
way in which a constructive distribution can take place: "Where a part-
nership assumes the separate liabilities of a partner or a liability to
which property owned by such partner is subject. . . the amount of the
decrease in such partner's liabilities is treated as a distribution of
money by the partnership to the partner." 34 As in subsection (b)(2), the
language contemplates action by the partnership, in this case the part-
nership must assume the liability previously assumed by a partner.
One example incorporated into Treasury Regulation 1.752-l(b)(2)
illustrates this point. A partner contributes property valued at $1000 to
a partnership in exchange for a one-third interest in the partnership.
The property is subject to a mortgage of $150, but the partner's original
basis of $1000 is reduced to $900, because two-thirds of the $150 mort-
gage liability is now allocable to the other partners. 35 In the example
given in the regulation, a transfer of property to the partnership and a
redistribution of mortgage liability resulted in a constructive distribu-
tion to the partner of $100. In the hypothetical, on the other hand, no
transfer between a partner and the partnership took place; instead,
there was only a shift in profit and loss interests among the partners
themselves. Thus, in the hypothetical case, the partnership's failure to
assume the partner's previous liabilities arguably prevents the regula-
tion from applying.
33. See I.R.C. § 731(a)(1) (1982).




This analysis of both subparts of Treasury Regulation 1.752-1(b)
proceeds from the premise that in each case there is an unsatisfied pre-
condition to finding a taxable event. This attempt to prevent section
752 from applying to flip-flops, however, is flawed. Treasury Regula-
tions are merely interpretations of the Code. Although regulations may,
if left undisturbed over time, gain something akin to the force of law, 36
they are in essence only "administrative interpretation[s] of the tax stat-
ute,"' 37 and thus cannot be viewed as definitive pronouncements on the
scope of the Code. Therefore, Treasury Regulations must be viewed as
exemplary, not definitive. The regulations often list several possible
fact situations to which a Code provision might apply, but the regula-
tions do not purport to exhaust the scope of the Code's application.
Thus, the Code may apply to a fact situation that does not fall within
the requirements of a particular regulation. Noncoverage in an illustra-
tive context does not dictate noncoverage in the wider statutory sense.
As a result, even though the regulations under section 752 do not ap-
ply,3s the reduction in a partner's share of partnership liabilities occa-
sioned by a ffip-flop 39 seems to constitute a constructive distribution
under section 752(b), unless some alternative method is available for
removing ffip-flops from the coverage of that section.
II. SEPARATION OF PARTNERSHIP INTERESTS
The argument that flip-flops are taxable events under section 752
necessarily assumes that when a partner reduces his profit and loss in-
terest, his share of partnership liabilities is simultaneously reduced. As
Treasury Regulation 1.752-1(e) states:
A partner's share of partnership liabilities shall be determined in
accordance with his ratio for sharing losses under the partnership
agreement .... However, where none of the partners have any per-
sonal liability with respect to a partnership liability (as in the case of
a mortgage on real estate acquired by the partnership without the
assumption by the partnership or any of the partners of any liability
on the mortgage), then all partners, including limited partners, shall
be considered as sharing such liability under section 752(c) in the
same proportion as they share the profits.40
36. Treasury Regulations are entitled to substantial deference and "must be sustained unless
unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statute." Commissioner v. South Tex.
Lumber Co., 333 U.S. 496, 501 (1948); accord, United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306-07
(1967).
37. W. ANDREWS, BASic FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 13 (2d ed. 1979).
38. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 25.
40. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1960).
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The regulation indicates that a reduction in a partner's profit and loss
interests inevitably results in a corresponding reduction in the partner's
share of the partnership. Nevertheless, it may be argued that if the
interests in a partnership are divided into several components the
reduction in one component will not necessarily entail reduction in
others. Unless there is a reduction or an increase in liabilities, section
752 does not apply.4'
Partnership agreements frequently divide partners' interests into
separate components. One component is a capital interest.42 Capital
interests usually consist of the right to a share of the partnership's assets
upon liquidation of the partnership and are distinct from a partner's
interest in profits. Therefore, although a partnership agreement may
provide that limited partners will have the same percentage interests in
capital, in profits, and in losses, those interests need not be the same.
Further justification for distinguishing between profit interests and
capital interests is found in the Uniform Partnership Act, which states
that "[tihe property rights of a partner are (1) his rights in specific part-
nership property, (2) his interest in the partnership, and (3) his right to
participate in the management."43 The second interest generally is
equated with a partner's right to share in partnership profits,44 and the
first interest would most likely be regarded as a capital interest.45
41. But see I A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL, & P. POSTLEWAITE, supra note 1, at § 46.02.
42. See Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1(e)(l)(v) (1983). This regulation provides:
Capital interest in a partnership. For purposes of Section 704(e), a capital interest in a
partnership means an interest in the assets of the partnership, which is distributable to
the owner of the capital interest upon his withdrawal from the partnership or upon liqui-
dation of the partnership. The mere right to participate in the earnings and profits of a
partnership is not a capital interest in the partnership.
The limitation, in the introductory language of subsection (e), to family partnerships at first
appears troubling. In fact, however, the Regulation is applied routinely in situations other than
family partnerships, even by the Internal Revenue Service. See Technical Advice Memorandum
7707260880A (July 29, 1977). Furthermore, other sections of the tax regulations refer to capital
interests in contexts not involving family partnerships. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1(b)(3) (1983)
(reference to I.R.C. § 267 necessary for computing extent of partner's ownership of capital inter-
est); Treas. Reg. § 1A01-10(d) (1983); Treas. Reg. § 53.4943-3(c)(2) (1983).
Additionally, general usage among tax practitioners indicates that the distinction between
capital interests and profit interests is not confined to family partnerships. See, e.g, AMERICAN L.
INsT. FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT 83-84 (Tent. Draft No. 8, 1982).
43. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 24, 6 U.L.A. 324 (1969).
44. See, e.g., Luick v. Luick, 164 Pa. Super. 378, 380, 64 A.2d 860, 861 (1949) (partner's
interest in partnership held to be his share of partnership profits and surplus, and to constitute
personal property).
45. There is substantial authority for the proposition that individual partners have no inter-
ests in specific partnership property, and that such property belongs instead to the firm. See, e.g.,
Buell Cabinet Co. v. Sudduth, 608 F.2d 431, 432 (10th Cir. 1979); Wolfe v. Hewes, 41 N.C. App.
88, 91, 254 S.E.2d 204, 206 (1979). Thus, the partners' rights to specific items of property arise
only upon liquidation of the partnership, when the remaining assets and capital are distributed.
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Capital accounts are the most convenient method for separating
capital interests from other interests. Capital accounts are simply ac-
counting balances that reflect each partner's equity investment in the
partnership46 and usually begin with the original contribution of capi-
tal. They are subsequently increased by any additional contributions
of capital, as well as by the partner's share of partnership profits, and
are decreased by distributions to the partner that reduce partnership
capital, as well as by the partner's share of partnership losses. 47 The
Code does not require any particular method for maintaining and com-
puting capital accounts.48 For example, to reflect tax basis more accu-
rately, a partnership agreement could provide that partners' shares of
partnership liabilities will be included in computing individual capital
accounts. 49 Upon termination of the partnership, assets are distributed
to the partners according to the balances in their capital accounts.50
Deficits must be made up by payments from the partners, and account
surpluses are distributed. Thus, a partner's capital account balance
serves as a method of computing the amount owed to him upon
liquidation.
A shift in profit and loss interests, such as that occurring in a flip-
flop, does not affect a partner's capital interest. When a capital account
is calculated according to the criteria set forth above, no change will be
registered when a partner's profit and loss interests are shifted, because
nothing occurs to decrease the account balance, unless the partners'
shares of partnership liabilities are included in their capital accounts.
A distribution to partners in reduction of partnership capital does not
occur because capital is in no way affected; similarly, the shift in profits
and losses does not instantaneously reduce partnership losses already
allocated to the partners.5' In the hypothetical described in section I,
the limited partners will have a lower percentage of profits and losses
allocated to them following the flip-flop in profit and loss interests.
Consequently, their capital account balances will differ in future years
46. See W. McKEE, W. NELSON & R. WHITMIRE, supra note 12, at 1 6.05[1].
47. See, id; cf 3 A. WILLIS, J. PENNELL & P. POSTLEWAITE supra note 1, at apps. A-14 (gen-
eral partnership model agreement), B-6 (limited partnership model agreement).
48. See Weidner, supra note 3, at 224.
49. See id Weidner further points out that deduction of partnership tax losses from capital
accounts means that actual economic investment is not reflected.
50. Comment, Partnership Allocations and Capital Accounts: A Technical Advice Memoran-
dum as Administrative Minefeld, 35 TAx L. REv. 441, 446 (1980).
51. In the event partnership liabilities, such as mortgage indebtedness, are included in part-
ners' capital accounts, Treasury Regulation 1.752-1(e) would seem to require a reduction in the
limited partners' accounts because of the statement in that Regulation that partnership liabilities
are to be shared in the same proportion as losses. See Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1983).
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as compared to when their profit interest was ninety percent. Thus, de-
pending on whether the partnership registers profits or losses, partners
will have to allocate more or less money to bring their capital accounts
to zero upon liquidation than they would have had to when they held a
larger profit interest. But the shift caused by the flip-flop does not itself
alter the capital accounts, and, thus, does not directly affect any part-
ner's rights to share in proceeds of the partnership upon liquidation.
As a result, because a flip-flop does not alter partners' liabilities, inas-
much as these are reflected in their capital accounts, one may argue
that no taxable event occurs under section 752.
In short, the argument that flip-flops involve no constructive distri-
bution derives from the fact that partnership agreements can be drafted
to distinguish between the various components of a partner's interest.
When partners remain liable for partnership obligations for the dura-
tion of the partnership, an intervening flip-flop should not be viewed
for tax purposes as reducing a partner's liability. As long as the partner
has the same obligation upon liquidation to make up the balance in his
capital account, or the same right to distribution of partnership assets
available after payment of obligations, no reduction in liability seems
to have taken place. To the extent that a partner's capital interest re-
mains constant throughout the life of the partnership, a change in the
partner's profit and loss sharing will not necessarily affect a partner's
rights or liabilities upon liquidation. These two interests are wholly
separate, and a change in one need not entail a corresponding change
in the other.
Although the analysis above seems attractive, this attempt to es-
cape the application of section 752(b) is not likely to succeed. The ar-
gument equates "liabilities" for subchapter K purposes with a partner's
obligations upon termination of the partnership or his interest in it.
Yet to equate these two things is clearly not permissible. The first part
of section 752(b) does not refer to obligations or liabilities of individual
partners, but instead to "a partner's share of the liabilities of a partner-
ship."' 52 Similarly, the opening phrase of the applicable regulation is:
"[a] Partner's share of partnership liabilities. '53 There is a critical dis-
tinction between shares of partnership liabilities during the existence of
a partnership, and an individual partner's capital account deficit upon
termination of the partnership. The former is a fundamental compo-
nent in subchapter K analysis of partnership income; the latter merely
deals with accounting principles in the organization of the particular
partnership. A partnership liability, such as mortgage indebtedness on
52. I.R.C. § 752(b) (1982).
53. Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1983).
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the partnership's principal asset, is quite different from the deficit in a
partner's capital account; and it is the former that section 752 ad-
dresses. Indeed, depending on the type of partnership, there may not
be capital account deficits to reconcile. At any rate, equating partner-
ship liabilities with a partner's obligations upon termination of the
partnership reflects incorrect usage of the term "liability." Conse-
quently, if these terms are employed correctly, Treasury Regulation
1.752-1(e) will operate to reduce a partner's share of partnership liabili-
ties-the only relevant liabilities-when there is a flip-flop that causes a
decrease in profit and loss interests. Thus, distinguishing between capi-
tal interests and profit and loss sharing will not serve to prevent section
752(b) coverage of flip-flops.
III. ECONOMIC GAIN
One additional argument for not taxing flip-flops as constructive
distributions of cash is that there is no economic gain to the limited
partner.54 Absent some form of economic gain, there is nothing to be
taxed.5 5 As one court stated, "true economic gain is the sine qua non to
income under the Code and the Sixteenth Amendment. 56 Examina-
tion of analogous situations involving release from liability provides a
useful tool for analyzing partnership flip-flops. Cancellation of indebt-
edness is one area around which a significant body of case law has
developed.
United States v. Kirby Lumber Co. 57 was the first case to establish
that cancellation of indebtedness could constitute income to the
debtor.58 The corporate taxpayer in that case repurchased some of its
own bonds on the open market for $138,000 less than the price at which
it had issued them earlier the same year. Because the company had
$138,000 in available assets after the repurchase that were no longer
offset by an obligation to pay full value for the bonds, the Supreme
54. Questions not discussed in this note may in some instances arise as to whether certain
allocations have substantial economic effect. See I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) (1982). A perceptive illustra-
tion of such questions, and a discussion of when allocations may be found to have been made
merely for tax avoidance, is found in Orrisch v. Commissioner, 55 T.C. 395 (1970).
55. An exception to this principle is the situation in which some provision of the Code states
that a taxable event occurs, even though no economic benefit to the taxpayer has occurred. See,
e.g., I.R.C. §§ 1245, 1250 (1982) (recapture of depreciation). Whether § 752(b) is such a provision,
at least as regards flip-flops, is the question discussed in this section.
56. Spartan Petroleum Co. v. United States, 437 F. Supp. 733, 735 (D.S.C. 1977).
57. 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
58. A useful discussion of the background litigation involved in the establishment of this
principle is found in Bittker & Thompson, Income From the Discharge ofIndebtedness: The Prog-
eny ofUnited States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1159-61 (1978).
[Vol. 1984:805
PARTNERSHIP TAX
Court held that the transaction generated taxable income.59 The Kirby
Lumber rule does not, however, mean that every case of cancellation of
indebtedness gives rise to realization of income. For example, if the
taxpayer is unable to derive any economic benefit from the cancella-
tion, perhaps because of bankruptcy, courts will hold that no taxable
income has been received. E.B. Higley & Co. v. Commissioner,60 a
Board of Tax Appeals case decided shortly after Kirby Lumber, in-
volved a corporate taxpayer that was in the hands of a receiver. Be-
cause the corporation was insolvent, its creditors agreed to cancel its
debt so that it might reorganize and continue as a viable business. The
Board held that because the corporation was insolvent when the credi-
tors cancelled the debt, the corporation had not received any taxable
income. Critical to this conclusion was the finding that "[t]he parties
contemplated no profit from the transaction, which merely relieved the
taxpayer from a portion of its liability.'6 1 The Board considered the
Kirby Lumber decision, but found it inapplicable because it believed
that certain extenuating factors-here, insolvency--could prevent a re-
duction in liability from triggering a taxable event.62
With this background in mind, one might argue that flip-flops
present an even stronger case for not allowing imposition of tax liabil-
ity than cancellation of indebtedness in bankruptcy proceedings. In
Higley, cancellation of the taxpayer's debt at least meant that the com-
pany would not be called upon in the future to pay the money it owed
to creditors; in that sense one can detect an indirect economic benefit.
But a partner whose profit interest changes does not even realize this
attenuated form of benefit. No debt is cancelled upon the shift in his
profit interest, nor does he obtain any release from his share of liabili-
ties. Without some such benefit, the underlying principle of Higley
seems to indicate that flip-flops may not be taxable events.
Similarly, in Towers & Sullivan Manufacturing Co. v. Commis-
sioner,6 3 a case involving a taxpayer corporation in debt to several cred-
itors, the creditors forgave twenty-five percent of the taxpayer's debt
and the taxpayer contested the Commissioner's finding that the for-
given debt constituted taxable income. The Board of Tax Appeals held
that there was no income because even after subtracting the taxpayer's
income from the amount forgiven, the company still sustained a net
loss for the year. Under these circumstances, the Board noted, "we do
59. 284 U.S. at 3.
60. 25 B.T.A. 127 (1932).
61. Id (emphasis added).
62. Id at 127-28.
63. 25 B.T.A. 922 (1932).
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not see how the amount forgiven can constitute income, but there is 'a
mere diminution of a loss.'-64 The Board found insufficient proof of
income despite the fact that the cancellation enabled the taxpayer to
continue its business, and to make a profit in subsequent years. 65 Noth-
ing in the Code limits the Towers & Sullivan principle to cases of for-
giveness of debt;66 indeed, this is but one of several forms of possible
64. Id at 925.
65. One criticism that might be leveled at Towers & Sullivan is its reliance on two prior cases:
In re Meyer Jewelry Co., 3 B.T.A. 1319 (1926) and John F. Campbell Co. v. Commissioner, 15
B.T.A. 458, affdsub nom. Burnet v. John F. Campbell Co., 50 F.2d 487 (D.C. Cir. 1931). These
are also cases in which forgiveness of debt was held not to constitute income; the problem is that
there is authority to the effect that Kirby Lumber overruled both of these cases. See Lakeland
Grocery Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 289, 293 (1937) (Sternhagen, J., concurring) ("Both
Meyer Jewelry Co .... and Burnet v. Campbell Co .... were decided before United States v. Kirby
Lumber Co., and in my opinion are incompatible with that decision and were overruled by it.").
Judge Sternhagen's statement need not be seen as troublesome for three reasons. First, the deci-
sion in Meyer Jewelry Co. that there was no taxable income was based in part on the then-applica-
ble definition of income as "gain derived from capital, from labor, or from both combined." See
Stratton's Independence, Ltd. v. Howbert, 231 U.S. 399, 415 (1913). To the extent that Kirby Lum-
ber overruled Meyer Jewelry Co., the invalidity of the latter case should be regarded as due to the
now-superseded definition of income applied there. The result in Towers & Sullivan did not de-
pend on that outmoded definition of income, and thus rests on an independent basis. That basis,
the theory of economic gain, is consistent with Kirby Lumber, indicating that the argument in
Towers & Sullivan is still valid.
Second, Higley, decided the same year as Towers & Sullivan, reached the same result-that
cancellation of indebtedness does not constitute income to an insolvent debtor. Higley relied on
the theory that a mere reduction in liability could not be equated with taxable income-which is
just an instance of the principle that economic gain is a prerequisite to taxation. Higley explicitly
considered the recent decision in Kirby Lumber, and found it inapplicable to cases in which a
debtor's insolvency prevented economic benefit.
Third, many cases decided after Kirby Lumber have followed the economic gain theory-
indicating that the two early cases should not be regarded as having been overruled by Kirby
Lumber. See infra note 68 and accompanying text. As a result, Towers & Sullivan, and related
cases, should not be seen as inconsistent with Kirby Lumber; the latter was simply a case where
economic gain accrued to the taxpayer, making the forgiveness of debt an appropriate event to
tax.
66. Another area in which courts hold that taxation is inappropriate in the absence of proof
of economic gain is the granting of corporate credit to shareholders. Generally, courts refuse to
allow imposition of tax liability until some actual release of the shareholder from liability has
occurred, or some other form of gain accrues to the taxpayer. A case in point is Maher v. Com-
missioner, 469 F.2d 225 (8th Cir. 1972), in which the taxpayer purchased all of the outstanding
stock of four corporations, making payment in part by promissory notes. As part of a plan to
combine the operations of two of the companies, the taxpayer assigned his contractual interest in
the stock of one corporation in exchange for the corporation's assumption of his liability on the
promissory notes. That company was subsequently dissolved, and its assets transferred to the
taxpayer, but only after it had made substantial payments of principal and interest on the two
notes. The corporation deducted these payments on its tax return in the appropriate years. The
question arose whether the taxpayer could be held to have realized income (to the extent of the
assuming corporation's earned surplus) in the amount of the payments made on the notes, in the
year the corporation assumed the taxpayer's liability on the notes, or in the year the payments
actually were made. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the Tax
Court's determination that the taxpayer received taxable income in the former year on the theory
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income set forth in section 61(e). Instead, as stated in Spartan Petro-
leum Co. v. United States,67 the requirement of economic benefit as a
prerequisite to taxation is applicable to other methods by which income
is recognized. 68 Cancellation of debt, therefore, is but one of several
that there was no release from liability, and thus no economic benefit to the taxpayer until the
corporation made the payments.
[T]he general rule is that there is no income unless and until there has been a release of
liability.. . . In the present case, while [the assuming company] contractually assumed
primary liability on the two notes, taxpayer remained secondarily liable until the notes
were actually paid. Whatever "economic benefit" may have accrued to taxpayer from
the reduction of his liability. . . is clearly incapable of being evaluated on an objective
basis.
469 F.2d at 229. See also Vinnell v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 934 (1969); Kleedon v. Commissioner,
3 T.C.M. (CCH) 1123 (1944); Cf. Jachs v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 879, 882-83 (8th Cir. 1960)
(existence of constructive dividend from corporation to shareholder dependent not upon motive or
interest of corporation, but upon receipt of economic benefit); Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462
(4th Cir. 1947); Schalk Chem. Co. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 879 (1959), a'd, 371 F.2d 816 (1st Cir.
1967) (taxpayer who is a recipient of some form of credit from a corporation receives income in
the year the corporation has the financial capacity to pay the debt and the shareholder has the
power to cause the debt to be paid); Treas. Reg. § 1.451-2(a) (1983) (constructive income deemed
received in year made available for use, provided taxpayer's control of receipt is not subject to
substantial restrictions or limitations).
67. 437 F. Supp. 733, 735 (D.S.C. 1977).
68. Sheraton Plaza Co. v. Commissioner, 39 T.C. 697 (1963), is an example of a subsequent
case following the principle that economic gain is a necessary prerequisite to taxation. The tax-
payer corporation was a wholly-owned subsidiary of a trust. After several years of operation the
trust purchased all the outstanding capital stock of the operating company that managed the tax-
payer's hotel business. The trustees then adopted a reorganization plan whereby the operating
company assigned all of its cash, accounts, inventory, and other assets to the taxpayer, in exchange
for 750 shares of the taxpayer's stock and an agreement by the taxpayer to assume all the operat-
ing company's debt. Thereafter, the taxpayer claimed deductions for rent payable to the trust
under various lease agreements. Because of concern over the federal income tax effect of inclusion
of both the trust and the taxpayer on the parent company's consolidated tax return, the trust
cancelled a debt of $72,000, owed by the taxpayer by virtue of liability originally incurred by the
operating company. The Commissioner assessed a deficiency in the amount of the cancellation,
but the Tax Court held to the contrary. The court stressed the importance of viewing the entire
transaction as a whole; here, the taxpayer without additional consideration assumed the obligation
to pay its parent the money owed by a third party, and it was this debt that was cancelled. The
significant factor is that at that time there was no more than an arms-length relationship between
the tenant and the petitioner's parent, the landlord, which actually received none of the accrued
rent; and one can safely assume, since no effort was made to collect the arrearages, that the origi-
nal debtor was insolvent. 39 T.C. at 705. The court here stressed the fact that no economic benefit
was conferred. Instead, it viewed the cancellation as a contribution to capital by the taxpayer's
sole shareholder, because the cancellation was part of a transaction that involved the transfer of
property.
In Astoria Marine Construction Co. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 798 (1949), the taxpayer corpo-
ration borrowed money for merchandise used in its business, which it was later unable to repay.
Because the creditor felt he could collect no more than $500, he accepted that amount in satisfac-
tion of the outstanding debt of $26,000. The Commissioner contended that the amount cancelled
should be included in the taxpayer's income, but the court noted that the taxpayer's outstanding
obligations exceeded its book value, and thus it was insolvent. Therefore, income could be recog-
nized only to the extent that cancellation of the debt resulted in an excess in value of assets over
remaining obligations. Assessing the sums listed in the taxpayer's accounts likely to be collected,
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ways in which one's liabilities may be reduced. Whatever the method
of reduction, if no economic gain is derived, taxation is inappropriate.
In the case of flip-flops, one would argue that because there is not even
a transaction giving rise to a reduction of liability, the flip-flop does not
generate any economic gain for partners. Whatever effect the shift in
profit and loss sharing may have on future income, it in no way affects
liabilities of the partnership, or a partner's eventual right to proceeds
on liquidation.
Nevertheless, this argument, like those preceding it, is flawed.
First, to the extent that the argument depends on the premise that there
is no reduction in liability when a flip-flop occurs, it rests on an incor-
rect assumption that a partner's share of partnership liabilities can be
equated with a partner's obligations upon termination of the partner-
ship.69 Regardless of the effect on capital account balances, the impor-
tant liabilities for subchapter K purposes are those of the partnership;
according to Treasury Regulation 1.752-1(e), one's share of those liabil-
ities must be reduced if one's share of profits and losses is reduced.
Second, the policy underlying the argument-that insolvency and
similar situations are a poor time to assess taxes-simply has no appli-
cability to real estate limited partnerships which high-bracket taxpayers
frequently use as investments. An individual whose business has col-
lapsed because of bankruptcy is in a vastly different position than one
whose tax bracket permits him to make profitable use of partnership-
generated deductions; the former certainly is more deserving of solici-
tous tax treatment than is the latter.
The third, and perhaps most important problem with this argu-
ment results from the language of the statute. Section 752(b), in fairly
the Tax Court found the total value of assets after discharge of the $26,000 would probably not
exceed $11,000. Thus, the court held that the Commissioner had erred in including $25,500 in the
taxpayer's income.
Astoria Marine simply applied a rule that found its basis in a 1937 Board of Tax Appeals case,
Lakeland Grocery Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 289 (1937). The insolvent taxpayer corpora-
tion there entered into an agreement with its creditors whereby the latter accepted $15,000 in
satisfaction of the former's $105,000 debt. The effect was to leave the company with a positive net
worth of $40,000. The court held there was taxable income, but only to the extent the debtor
became solvent. Debt cancellation does not result in income if the taxpayer was insolvent before,
and remains so after, the discharge, because there is no increase in the taxpayer's net worth by
reason of such a discharge. That is, no gain is realized. See also Progress Paper Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 20 B.T.A. 234 (1930); Eastside Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 18 B.T.A. 461 (1930); Simmons
Gin Co. v. Commissioner, 16 B.T.A. 793 (1929), afd, 43 F.2d 327 (10th Cir. 1930). Likewise, in
White v. Commissioner, 34 B.T.A. 424 (1936), a portion of a partnership's debt was cancelled.
Because the partnership was solvent and able to pay its debts in the year of cancellation, it was
held to have received income to the extent it was made solvent.
69. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
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unequivocal terms, equates reductions in shares of partnership liabili-
ties with distributions of income. That fact seems to put section 752 on
the same footing as such other provisions as section 1245 and section
1250,70 which create a taxable event in situations in which no custom-
ary form of income exists. Thus, the mandate of section 752(b) seems
to dispel any doubt about the tax consequences of ffip-flops. 71
IV. CONCLUSION
This note has developed three possible reasons why section 752
might not apply to ffip-flops. Each approach appears unsatisfactory.
The first approach will not succeed because requirements set forth in
the applicable Treasury Regulations that would assist partners in es-
caping the terms of section 752 cannot be deemed to control the scope
of the tax statute; instead, the fact situations covered by the regulations
are merely exemplary, not definitive. The second approach fails be-
cause separation of capital interests and profit and loss sharing does not
provide a distinction meaningful for subchapter K analysis; the obliga-
tions relevant for capital accounts are not the same as the liabilities that
are the subject of section 752, and to the extent the latter are altered by
flip-flops, the Code indicates that taxation must follow. The third ap-
proach, analogizing flip-flops to cancellation of indebtedness and other
situations in which tax will be deferred or forgiven, is also inappropri-
ate; high-bracket taxpayers do recognize substantial benefit from lim-
ited partnerships, and should not escape tax liability triggered by a shift
in profit and loss interests contrary to the mandate of section 752.
Ross Lipman
70. See supra note 55.
71. The current Code treatment of discharge of debt in cases of bankruptcy or insolvency
illustrates this point, I.R.C. § 108(b)(2) directs that a taxpayer's tax attributes, such as basis of
various properties, be reduced when a discharge is excludible from gross income. Reduction of
these attributes is just a reflection of the fact that if a taxpayer receives some reduction of his
liabilities, even where no current economic gain results, his tax burden in the future should reflect
the benefit received. Thus, the former complete forgiveness of tax that resulted from cases holding
that no taxable event occurred has been eliminated. Instead, § 108 simply allows a deferral of
tax-for example, until the time of sale of property the basis of which was reduced pursuant to
§ 108.
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